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2Abstract
This paper proposes a dual-level inefficiency model for analysing datasets with a sub-company
structure, which permits firm inefficiency to be decomposed into two parts: a component that
varies across different sub-companies within a firm (internal inefficiency); and a persistent
component that applies across all sub-companies in the same firm (external inefficiency). We
adapt the models developed by Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1995) and Kumbhakar and
Heshmati (1995), making the same distinction between persistent and residual inefficiency, but in
our case across sub-companies comprising a firm, rather than over time. The proposed model is
important in a regulatory context, where datasets with a sub-company structure are commonplace,
and regulators are interested in identifying and eliminating both persistent and sub-company
varying inefficiency. Further, as regulators often have to work with small cross-sections, the
utilisation of sub-company data can be seen as an additional means of expanding cross-sectional
datasets for efficiency estimation. Using an international dataset of rail infrastructure managers
we demonstrate the possibility of separating firm inefficiency into its persistent and sub-company
varying components. The empirical illustration highlights the danger that failure to allow for the
dual-level nature of inefficiency may cause overall firm inefficiency to be underestimated.
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31. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to propose, and illustrate via an empirical example, a dual-level
inefficiency model that enables firm inefficiency to be separated into two components: a
component that varies across different sub-companies within a firm (internal inefficiency); and a
persistent component that applies across all sub-companies in the same firm (external
inefficiency). Here we use the term “sub-company” to refer to sub-divisions within the firm based
around, for example, regional or business unit structures. External inefficiency reflects the extent
to which even the best performing sub-company unit in the firm fails to match best practice
within the industry.
The proposed model is important for three reasons. First, in the regulatory context, where the
global trend towards privatisation, and the associated development of RPI-X regulation, has led to
the creation of numerous regulatory bodies with a direct interest in estimating the efficiency of
firms under their jurisdiction. The proposed dual-level model should enable regulators to obtain a
clearer understanding of both internal and external inefficiency. Separating out internal efficiency
from the wider external inefficiency clearly has benefits to regulators (and firms) since they can
use the analysis to determine the appropriate emphasis on two performance enhancing strategies.
First, regulators will expect regulated firms to focus on implementing internal best practice across
all sub-company units. This would aim to eliminate internal inefficiency. Regulators would also
expect firms to learn from external best practice and apply this firm wide (thus eliminating
external inefficiency)1.
The second reason why we consider the proposed model to be important is the following.
Economic regulators often have to work with small cross-sections. Whilst some regulators have
sought to alleviate this problem by utilising panel data sets, these are often short (as a result of
industry restructuring at the time of privatisation); or where longer panels exist, the ability to
specify an appropriate, flexible model of time varying efficiency becomes critical, and may not
be straightforward. The data structure under consideration in this paper sees the utilisation of sub-
company data as an additional means of expanding cross-sectional datasets for the purpose of
efficiency estimation. The utilisation of such data should therefore enable more precise measures
of overall firm efficiency to be obtained.
This second benefit is directly analogous to that obtained from traditional panel data (see Schmidt
and Sickles 1984). That is, the sub-company observations can be seen as multiple observations on
the same firm in the same way as standard (time-based) panel data. Further, when a sub-company
dataset is augmented with repeat observations over time, firm-specific time paths of inefficiency
are likely to be more precisely estimated – as compared to the situation where only standard panel
data (not augmented by sub-company data) is available – which again is important for economic
regulators.
Thirdly, it is beneficial for both efficiency performance analysis and more generally cost analysis
to analyse data at a level of geographical disaggregation that corresponds to how firms organise
1 Even under incentive-based (RPI-X) regulation, regulators are interested in the sources of inefficiency in order to
assess deliverability of savings (without compromising safety and quality), and to monitor progress. Understanding
the split between internal versus external inefficiency thus provides important information for the regulator.
4their activities. This allows both for any dual-level inefficiency to be captured, but also allows for
the true scale and density properties of the cost frontier to be established.
Datasets with a sub-company structure readily exist, either residing with economic regulators, or
within the cost accounting systems of firms. As such it is sensible to ask how such data sets
should best be exploited and this is the subject of this paper. Importantly we draw attention to
some statistical tests which can be used to help identify the appropriate treatment of inefficiency
effects when sub-company data is available. To our knowledge, the benefits and modelling issues
associated with expanding datasets to include sub-company data – including the similarities to
and differences from the standard panel case – have not been discussed in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we define what we mean by a
sub-company structure. Section 3 describes the general modelling framework and interesting
special cases. The possible estimation methods are then set out in section 4. Section 5 sets out the
empirical example, which demonstrates some of the potential benefits from utilising sub-
company data and the possible problems. The empirical application builds on an important
international benchmarking study that the authors undertook in 2008, together with the British
Office of Rail Regulation (ORR), aimed at estimating the efficient cost of sustaining and
developing Britain’s rail network. Finally, section 6 offers some conclusions.
2. The data structure
As noted in the introduction, the envisaged data structure under consideration in this paper is one
which contains N firms, over T(i) years, with S(i) (i=1,…,N) sub-company units within each firm
(see Figure 1). The N dimension of the data structure could either be viewed as comprising a
number of regulated firms operating under the same regulatory regime (yardstick competition), or
firms operating in the same industry but in different countries (international benchmarking). The
precise nature of the S dimension depends on the industry, but in all cases should represent a
level of disaggregation which has operational relevance and for which data is available. Figure 1
illustrates the data structure for the empirical example shown in section 5.
5Figure 1 Sub-company data structure
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Most regulated, network utilities, have some kind of de-centralised decision-making structure,
comprising a corporate centre and separate business units, in many cases based on a regional
organisational structure. The proposed model therefore potentially has very wide application in a
regulatory context. As an example, the water industry in England and Wales consists of a number
of water and sewerage firms, where each firm also collects data at the sub-company level, in this
case derived from multiple observations on specific assets in different locations within the same
firm (for example, sewage treatment plants). The water economic regulator, OFWAT, has utilised
sub-company data across the regulated firms under its jurisdiction in its comparative efficiency
work. However, importantly, the motivation in that case was simply to expand the size of the data
set, with the data being pooled and treated merely as a larger cross-section (see OFWAT 1994;
2005).
More widely, economic regulators have commissioned internal benchmarking studies, for
example in the case of rail infrastructure (see LEK, 2003) and gas distribution (see OFGEM,
2003), in order to understand variation in performance within-companies. The internal
benchmarking approach is also recognised in the academic literature (e.g. Burns and Weyman
Jones, 1998, and Kennedy and Smith, 2004).
The empirical application (section 5) is based on an international dataset of railway infrastructure
firms. These firms are monopoly operators of the rail network in each country and therefore an
external efficiency perspective cannot be obtained by looking at domestic comparators2. Within
each network, operations are organised into smaller regional units, at which maintenance activity
is organised, and these form the S dimension. The dataset also has a panel structure in time.
2 At least in terms of efficiency levels. Some regulators have compared trends in efficiency / productivity between
different industries however.
6Whilst economic regulators have utilised sub-company data in a simple way and some have
commissioned internal benchmarking studies as noted above, this paper is, to our knowledge, the
first attempt in the literature to estimate a dual-level inefficiency model.
3. Sub-company model of inefficiency
In this section we develop a stochastic frontier cost3 model which allows for both persistent, firm-
specific and sub-company level inefficiency effects (external and internal inefficiency
respectively). We also outline the interesting special cases which are used as (nested) comparator
models in the empirical illustration that follows.
3.1 Dual-level inefficiency model
We consider a cost frontier transformed by taking logarithms. The inefficiency term(s), while
initially multiplicative, are additive following the logarithm transformation:
(1) itsitsits vu);(fCln D ȕ; its i=1,…,N, t=1,…,T(i), s=1,…,S(i)
where itsC is the cost for sub company unit s in firm i in time period t, D is a constant, itsX is a
vector of logged outputs and input prices (and covariants if applicable), ȕ is the conformable
vector of parameters, itsv is a random variable representing statistical noise and itsu is a variable
representing inefficiency. itsv is assumed to be distributed independently from the regressors and
itsu .
In order to consider inefficiency effects at two levels within the firm , we decompose itsu into:
(2) itsititsu WP with itsit vAP , iid~itP and iid~itsW .
In this formulation itsu is split into two components: itP , which is the persistent element of
inefficiency that applies across all sub-companies within the same company; and itsW , which is
the residual component that varies randomly across all sub-companies. Both inefficiency terms
may either be fixed over time or vary in some way. In order to explain the economic
interpretation of our model, and its position within the literature, we first drop the t subscripts
from the model and focus on the sub-company structure of the data. We then briefly outline the
different assumptions that may be made concerning the variation of inefficiency over time,
although the time dimension is not central to this paper.
For ease of exposition we therefore now re-write equations (1) and (2) without the time subscripts
as:
3 As widely noted in the literature, the model can easily be translated into a production function by reversing the sign
on itsu .
7(3) isisis vu);(fCln D ȕ; is i=1,…,N, , s=1,…,S(i)
(4) isiisu WP with isi vAP , iid~iP and iid~isW .
This formulation is analogous to that presented in Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1995) and
Kumbhakar and Heshmati (1995). In their formulation, applicable to standard panel data (i and t
subscripts only), iP represents the persistent (over time) element of inefficiency, and itW is the
residual component of inefficiency4 (both of which are one-sided). Here we make the same
distinction between persistent and residual inefficiency, but this time over sub-companies
comprising a firm, rather than time. We note that in the standard panel literature the iP term has
also been interpreted as a measure of unobserved heterogeneity (see Greene 2005; Kumbhakar
1991; Heshmati and Kumbhakar 1994). However, for the purpose of this paper we ignore
unobserved heterogeneity and focus on the inefficiency interpretation.
The economic interpretation of the model outlined above is as follows. Inefficiency within an
organisation is assumed to reside at two levels. First of all, there is a component due to the central
management of individual firms, which sets company strategy, and various policies and
standards. This is the persistent element that applies across all sub-companies within the same
company ( iP ). The persistent element of inefficiency so calculated represents the best practice
performance of the i-th firm relative to the best practice performance of the other firms in the
sample.
Second, to the extent that the sub-company units have some degree of autonomy in how they
interpret and then deliver the policies set out by central management, there is a second component
that captures inefficiency at the sub-company level within each company – that is, the extent to
which sub-company units fail to reach the best practice attained elsewhere within the same firm
( isW )5. Thus the model separates persistent, firm-specific inefficiency effects (or external
inefficiency) from internal inefficiency at the sub-company level. It should be noted that since
isu is the inefficiency of each sub-company in the sample (comprising a persistent and random
element), a further step is required to produce an overall measure of firm inefficiency. Overall
inefficiency for an individual firm is computed therefore as the sum of the persistent element and
a weighted average of the random component for each of the sub-companies within the firm:
(5) ¦
¦


W
P 
s
is
s
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C
C
u
4 We use the terms persistent and residual inefficiency as in Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1995).
5 Since the sub-company varying component is an absolute measure of inefficiency, the efficiency scores for each
sub-company unit are measured relative to a theoretical frontier and for a given sample it will not necessarily be the
case that one sub-company within each firm will be on the frontier.
8Finally as noted in the introduction, the use of sub-company data has benefits for performance
analysis and more generally cost analysis beyond the ability to measure dual level performance. It
substantially increases the number of observations for analysis which addresses a common
problem in economic regulation (small N). Further, aggregation bias can arise in an estimated
cost function if data is aggregated at a level that is not equivalent to the level at which operational
decisions are actually made (Theil, 1954). For example analysing infrastructure of railways using
national data may lead to misleading estimates of economies of network size if the railway is in
fact organised into zones. A more useful concept would be to look at the economies relating to
network zone size. Obviously much depends on what the analyst is trying to understand in the
first place, but we do note that for cost analysis, sub-company data provides a much richer dataset
to investigate much more subtle distinctions regarding economies of size and density.
3.2 Sub-company inefficiency invariance model
One interesting special case that is nested within the model outlined in equations (3) and (4) is the
sub-company inefficiency invariance model. Where it is reasonable to assume that s,i0is  W ,
that is, all inefficiency is persistent across sub-companies in a firm, and thus there is no additional
inefficiency variation between sub-companies comprising a firm, then the model can be written:
(6) isiis v);(fCln PD ȕ; is i=1,…,N, s=1,…,S(i)
In this case the model has reduced to a more conventional model, analogous to the time invariant
inefficiency models of Pitt and Lee (1981) or Schmidt and Sickles (1984), but with inefficiency
invariance in sub-companies comprising a firm rather than across time.
We note here that one of the weaknesses of the time invariant model in the standard panel
inefficiency model literature is that it may not be appropriate to assume that inefficiency is
invariant over time, particularly when panels are long (and of course it is exactly when panels are
long that the benefits of the panel approach to inefficiency estimation are fully felt). Whilst the
assumption of sub-company inefficiency invariance may likewise be challenged – in fact, the
presence of sub-company effects is the motivation behind the dual-level efficiency model – this
assumption may be a reasonable approximation in some circumstances (when there is little sub-
company autonomy). Furthermore, the assumption does not necessarily become more implausible
as the number of sub-company units is increased (as is the case for long panels). Importantly,
since this model is nested within the dual-level inefficiency model, we can test for the absence of
sub-company inefficiency variation.
3.3 The pooled model
The restriction 0i  P i yields a simple pooled model in which the inefficiency of each sub-
company ( isisu W ) is assumed to be identically and independently distributed across all sub-
company units irrespective of which firm they belong to. In this case the central management in
each firm plays no role at all from an inefficiency perspective. Since this model is nested within
the dual-level inefficiency model, we can test for the absence of a persistent, firm-specific
inefficiency component.
93.4 Assumptions about inefficiency variation over time
The empirical illustration shown in this paper comprises data both at sub-company level and over
time. However, the focus in this paper is on the sub-company dimension of the panel structure.
Therefore, the dual-level inefficiency model outlined in equations (1) and (2) makes a simple
assumption concerning the variation in inefficiency over time ( iid~itP and iid~itsW ). The
pooled model likewise makes a simple assumption regarding the variation in inefficiency over
time ( iid~u itsits W ). In the sub-company invariance inefficiency model estimated (equation
(5)), where 0its  W , firm inefficiency ( iP ) is assumed to be invariant over both sub-company and
over time.
It should be noted, however, that it is possible to make alternative assumptions about the
behaviour of both the itP and itsW inefficiency terms over time. These include independence and
time invariance over time as noted above, but could be extended to allow varying inefficiency
over time via a deterministic scaling model (presented in the most general forms in Kumbhakar
and Lovell 2000; Orea and Kumbhakar 2004). However, for the purpose of this paper, which
focuses on the sub-company dimension of the panel structure, in the empirical example we retain
one of the simple assumptions noted above (time invariance), and leave the development of more
complex time varying models to further work (see section 5). We do show how to estimate such
paths in section 4 for the case of the sub-company invariance model. Importantly sub-company
data structure potentially provides a powerful way to estimate firm specific paths of inefficiency
over time, since there can be many observations per firm relative to the number of time periods,
vis-à-vis the use of panel data where the number of observations per firm is equal to the number
of time periods to which they are observed.
4. Estimation
4.1 Dual-level inefficiency level model
We first introduce the estimation framework, which draws on the approach by Kumbhakar and
Hjalmarsson (1995) and Kumbhakar and Heshmati (1995). In this framework we consider
equation (1) rewritten as:
(7) itsitsitits v);(fCln WD ȕ; its
where itit PD D .
At this stage we have not made distributional assumptions on the two inefficiency error
components, except that they are distributed independently of the random noise term itsv and
independently of each other. We now make additional assumptions to facilitate estimation. First
we make assumptions as to whether itP or correspondingly itD are correlated with the regressors.
If so we consider itD to be a fixed effect. If not then we could consider itD to be a random
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effect. Second we make the assumption that itsW is uncorrelated with the regressors and itsW is a
random effect. Treating itsW as a random effect is a necessary assumption for the case of T=1.
This model could be estimated in several ways. The first two methods use maximum likelihood to
estimate the model in one stage. These are variants of the ‘True’ fixed and random effects models
proposed by Greene (2005). In both cases  2its ,0Niid~ WVW and  2vits ,0iidN~v V , however it is
possible to relax the assumption of homoscedasticity and zero mean of the (untruncated)
distributions (Greene 2005). The formulation is the same as the original formulation of the pooled
stochastic frontier model proposed by Aigner et al (1977), but with effects by firm per time
period6.
In the True fixed effects case, itD is treated as a fixed effect and maximum likelihood is used to
estimate the model. This case allows itD to be correlated with the regressors. A potential
disadvantage of this estimation approach is, because of the presence of fixed effects, estimates of
all parameters in the model (not just the fixed effects) may be inconsistent and biased. This is
known as the incidental parameters problem (Neyman and Scott 1984; Lancaster 2000). Greene
(2005) provides Monte Carlo evidence that the bias does not appear to be substantial when T=5,
which is encouraging given the short nature of panels typically available for performance analysis
studies.
Estimation of this model by maximum simulated likelihood yields estimates of 22vit ,,, WVVD ȕ .
Ignoring for now the fact that the itD ’s are estimates and not population values, following
Schmidt and Sickles (1984),
(8)   DoD
pit
min foT
As such a consistent estimator of itP is given by
(9)   itpititit maxÖ PoDD P foT
For finite T, this method of recovery of itP results in a measure of relative inefficiency (relative
to the best performing firm/time observation). However this estimator cannot be constructed
because the itD ’s have to be estimated. Thus the feasible estimator of itP is:
6 Note that by effects by firm per time period we do not mean that this has two way effects in firm and time. Instead
we mean there is one set of effects, with one effect for each year and firm. This is very general. We could replace this
with an assumption that the persistent inefficiency of sub-companies in a firm is also time invariant, in which case
iiit PD D D . This is the assumption we use in our empirical example. A further assumption could be that
2
3i2i1iit tt DDD D , that is that the persistent inefficiency follows a Cornwell et. al. (1990) type variation
over time.
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(10)  ititit ÖmaxÖÖÖ DD P
The analytic conditional expectation estimator proposed by Jondrow et al (1982) can be used to
calculate a point estimate for the residual component of inefficiency, itsW :
(11) > @   **its
**its
**itsitsits
/1
/
|E VU)
VUIVU HW
where  2v2its2*its VVHV U WW ,  2v22v22* VVVV V WW and  I and  ) are the standard normal
pdf and cdf respectively. To operationalise this, 2WV and 2vV are replaced with their corresponding
estimates and itsH with
(12) )Ö;(fÖClnÖ ititsits ȕ;itsD H
In the true random effects case, itD is treated as random and assumed independent of the
regressors. We estimate this model by simulated maximum likelihood, rather than simple
maximum likelihoods because simulation is used to integrate out the random effect itD from the
likelihood function. Unlike the formulation in Greene (2005), a normal distribution cannot be
assumed for this effect, since this variable is truncated from below at D . Instead we assume that
itD comprises:
(13) itit PD D  2it ,0Niid~ PVP
The model now comprises the usual composite error term as proposed by Jondrow et al (1977)
distributed independently by each sub-company and by time, but also a random parameter, the
constant term, which varies independently by firm and by time period. Estimation of this model
by maximum simulated likelihood yields estimates of 222v ,,,, PW VVVD ȕ . Firm and time specific
estimates of itD , denoted itÖD , are estimated as the expectation of itD conditional on the data and
the estimated parameters as given in equation 32 in Greene (2005). This is a consistent estimator
as foT (Train 2003, p. 269). This is approximated during the simulation of the likelihood
function in estimation. itP is then estimated as:
(14) DD P ÖÖÖÖ itit
Importantly note that the estimate of itP is an estimate of absolute persistent inefficiency as
opposed to the relative measures which are produced by the other estimation methods discussed
in this paper. This is because D is estimated through the maximum simulated likelihood process
since it is the truncation point and mean of the underlying normal distribution of itD . An estimate
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for the residual component of sub-company inefficiency, itsW , is the same as for the True fixed
effects case.
An alternative estimation framework is the multistage approach outlined in Kumbhakar and
Hjalmarsson (1995) and Kumbhakar and Heshmati (1995). In this approach the model is first
estimated by either within or generalised least squares estimation, depending on whether the itD s
are treated as fixed or random effects respectively. Following this estimation the residuals, itsÖH ,
are computed and these are used to compute the fixed or random effects, itÖD (as outlined in
Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson 1995; Kumbhakar and Heshmati 1995). An estimate of itP is then
recovered as
(15)  ititit DDP ÖmaxÖÖÖ  
The second stage comprises the use of conditional maximum likelihood estimation7 to estimate
the parameters of the specified distributions of itsW and itsv . Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1995)
and Kumbhakar and Heshmati (1995) utilise a half normal and normal distribution for the two
error components. Adopting these distributions for itsW and itsv the conditional log likelihood
function (for each observation) is8:
(16)      2itsitsitsist
2
1
lnlnconstant,,|, VYVOY)V YDOV ȕ"
Where itsitsits vW Y , vVV O W and 2v2 VV V W . We replace itsY with the consistent
estimates given in the earlier stages by ititsits
ÖÖÖÖ PH Y .
Summing over all observations and maximising with respect to V and O yields consistent
estimates of the parameters of the distributions of itsW and itsv . Following this, the Jondrow et al
(1982) estimator can be applied as above to yield an estimate of itsW as given in equation x.
Importantly in the first stage, no distributions have been specified for any error components. As
such the main parameter estimates, ȕ , are consistently estimated even if the resulting
distributional assumptions in the second stage prove incorrect. Also if the itD ‘s are treated as
fixed effects, the multistage approach has the advantage that this model does not suffer from the
incidental parameters problem since in the first stage, the incidental parameters are swept out by
the within transformation. Thus it is possible to introduce correlation between the firm persistent
inefficiency component and the regressors without the potential inconsistency resulting from the
incidental parameters problem. The inevitable trade-off against this robustness is a loss of
7 Conditional on the (consistent) estimates in the first stage.
8 Note that we reverse the sign on VOY its vis-à-vis Kumbhakar and Heshmati (1995) since we are estimating a
cost frontier.
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estimation efficiency relative to specifying (correctly) a full maximum likelihood function to be
estimated (such as using the approach by Greene (2005) above).
Since the remaining error components ( itsits vW ) are assumed to not be correlated with the
regressors and itP both estimation methods are consistent9.
4,2 Sub-company inefficiency invariance model
The case of both time invariant inefficiency and independence over time is an extension of the
Pitt and Lee model with slightly different subscripts. As such we refer readers to Pitt and Lee’s
(1981) paper for details of the likelihood function. Likewise for the time varying models these are
trivial extensions of the general time varying presented in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) and
Orea and Kumbhakar (2004). The likelihood function for the model for standard panel data is
presented in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) and this requires only trivial sub-script amendments
to form the required likelihood functions for the variants of the model discussed in 3.2. We
assume that the distribution of the inefficiency term is:
 2,~ PVSP iit N  when independence over time is assumed for inefficiency and
  iiit g P P it=į
 with  2ii ,N~ P VSP when dependence of inefficiency over time is allowed
for.
For all of these models, except the model which assumes independence over time of inefficiency,
an estimate of firm inefficiency is given by the conditional expectation of the inefficiency
component and is amended from Greene (2008) and given below:
(17) > @   > @      »»¼
º
««¬
ª
¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§
)  ii
ii
iiiiiiiit gEgE VP
VPIVPHPHP ~~
~~
~~||
Where )()()(2)(111 ,,,,, iSiiTiSiiSiii HHHHH  ,
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The equivalent estimator for the case of independence across time is a trivial adaptation of the
estimator presented in Battese and Coelli (1988) (summation over s rather than over t) and so we
do not present it here.
9 Provided in the GLS case the regressors and itP are uncorrelated as discussed earlier.
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5. Empirical application – International railway infrastructure comparisons
5.1 Context
We illustrate our approach by estimating a dual-level inefficiency model using data on five
railway infrastructure managers, comprising firms from North America alongside European
national infrastructure managers (IMs). A railway infrastructure manager is responsible for the
management (maintenance and renewal) of the railway infrastructure (permanent way, structures,
line side equipment and stations and depots). An infrastructure manager is different conceptually
from a train operator who actually runs the train services. In the case of Britain, the infrastructure
manager is institutionally separate from train operating companies. For the other companies, the
IM also runs the train services, but importantly, separate accounts are available for the IM side
and also the structure of the companies is such that the two functions can be considered divorced
in terms of business organisation.
As noted earlier, this paper builds on a previous study conducted for the British Office of Rail
Regulation (ORR) as part of the 2008 Periodic Review of the British infrastructure manager’s
efficiency performance10. In that work, which was exploratory in nature, and based on a smaller
sample than we now have available, we estimated the simplest, single-level efficiency versions of
the models presented in this paper (namely the pooled and sub-company invariant models; see
section 3).
Each IM in the sample is divided into a number of regions. The number of regions per IM (S(i)
using the terminology in section 3) ranges from 3 to 18. The difference in the number of regions
per IM reflects both the availability of data (in respect of the number of years available for each
firm) and also, importantly, the organisational structure of the IM. Thus the definition of a region
for each IM is such that it is expected that there exists some management autonomy at the
regional level as well as at the firm head office level. Hence, there is a need at least to consider a
dual-level inefficiency model.
As noted in section 3, it is beneficial for both efficiency performance analysis and more generally
cost analysis to analyse data at a level of geographical aggregation that corresponds to how firms
organize their activities. This allows both for any dual-level inefficiency to be captured, but also
allows for the true scale and density properties of the cost frontier to be established. Thus while
the range of regions per IM may appear large, this is partly due to the overall size differences of
the IMs considered. Further, we have assurance that these breakdowns have degrees of autonomy,
thus making it appropriate to analyse efficiency at this level.
For some IMs our dataset is supplemented by having repeat observations over time (T(i) ranges
from 1 to 5). The panel covers the period 2002 to 2007, though is unbalanced in time as noted.
Overall we have a total of 89 observations on the five IMs. As discussed in section 3, an
assumption about how inefficiency behaves over time is required in this case. Given the
unbalanced nature of the observations over time and the generally small number of time periods
10 See Smith et. al. (2008) and ORR (2008) for details of the work undertaken. Note that the railway companies
considered are slightly different in the analysis for this paper than in the Periodic Review analysis.
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for most IMs, we choose to adopt a time invariant model. Thus both the firm and sub-company
inefficiency components are time invariant in our model.
The data structure enables the investigation of efficiency variation between rail systems in
different countries, whilst also looking at inefficiency at the sub-company level within each
system. The use of sub-company data also expands the sample size substantially without the need
to collect a long panel. The utilisation of sub-company data can thus be seen as interesting and
important in an international benchmarking context where cross-sections may well be small and
panels short.
It should be noted that, given the sensitive nature of efficiency analysis and its implications for
the companies (both from a competitive and regulatory perspective), the efficiency scores for
individual companies and sub-company units are anonymised. This commitment was a formal
requirement prior to obtaining the data and without which the data would not have been released
for analysis. However, the results still enable us to draw conclusions about the impact of
alternative methods on the firm efficiency scores, as well as the split between persistent and sub-
company varying inefficiency, which is the primary focus of this paper.
5.2 Data
The data is summarised in Table 1. The dependent variable is maintenance cost, comprising all
elements of railway infrastructure maintenance (e.g. permanent way, structures and signalling).
Note that in railway accounts, maintenance is distinct from renewals activity, where renewals
expenditure is the like-for-like replacement of assets following life expiration and maintenance
expenditure is the day to day up keep of the assets to keep them in safe and operable condition.
Whilst there could be definitional differences between countries which affect this variable (as is
the case in any international study) as part of data collection process considerable efforts were
made to harmonise definitions across countries which adds to our confidence in the data. We
convert the country specific cost data into US dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP)
exchange rates. We also convert the data to 2006 constant prices.
Our explanatory variables comprise tonne density, defined as gross tonne-km per track-km
(TTKD) and track-km (Track) for outputs in order to account for scale and density effects. We
also include the proportion of track length that is electrified (ProElect) as a proxy for the quality
of the infrastructure. We do not have price indices for capital between countries, but note that the
PPP exchange rate adjustment should account for some of the differences across countries. We do
have wage rate data for each of the IMs. We do note that these are company-wide rather than sub-
company specific and that in some cases the data is based on all staff employed by the railway,
not just infrastructure maintenance. Thus the Wage variable is relatively crude and as such we
discuss the sensitivity of our results to its inclusion. The data is normalised to the sample mean
which implies the coefficients on the first order variables represent elasticities at the sample
mean11.
11 Note ProElect is not normalised to the sample mean.
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Table 1 Summary of data used in the study (unnormalised data)
Variable Mean
Standard
Deviation Min Max
Maintenance Cost 43,801,077 28,162,452 9,103,240 114,210,161
Tonne Density (Tonne-km / Track-km) (TTKD) 8,059,323 6,157,594 1,077,481 21,808,976
Track-km (Track) 928 588 252 2,988
Proportion of track-km electrified (ProElect) 0.65 0.41 0.00 1.00
Average staff cost per staff member (Wage) 57,408 9,473 39,791 84,378
Note: costs are in 2006 US $
5.3 Results
In Table 2 we present the parameter estimates from the dual-level efficiency models, estimated by
assuming the iD are fixed and random effects in turn (we use LIMDEP v9 to operationalise the
multistage fixed and random effects estimation approaches, and details of the code are available
from the authors on request). We also present the parameter estimates for the two special (nested)
cases of the dual-level model as discussed in section 3. First, the sub-company inefficiency
invariance model (fixed and random effects cases), which corresponds to the fixed / random
effects models used as the first stage in the dual-level model. Second, we show the special case
where inefficiency is only sub-company varying (no persistent, firm-specific effects), which we
refer to as the pooled model in line with the terminology used in section 312.
The functional form was chosen by first estimating a Translog and then testing down. The vast
majority of second order terms had very low t statistics and in addition to the squared track term,
only an interaction term between wage and track was significant at any reasonable significance
level. However inclusion of this term yielded a model with implausible negative wage elasticities
for many observations within the sample. For this reason, we dropped this term. Importantly, the
joint restriction that all of the omitted second order terms (including the wage / track interaction)
were equal to zero could not be rejected at any reasonable significance level (e.g. Wald test in
random effects model treatment gave a statistic value of 12.12 and an associated p value of
0.19804 (9 degrees of freedom)). As such we conclude that our specification is both a useful and
intuitive economic model of the underlying cost characteristics while its parsimony is supported
by the data.
Turning to the choice of fixed versus random effects, first note as discussed in section 3, this
refers to the persistent, firm-specific effect in the model ( iD ). The Hausman test gives a p value
of 0.0861 which indicates a preference for random effects at the 5 per cent significance level.
However we still report the fixed effects results for comparative purposes.
12 We note that while the terminology “pooled model” accurately describes the pooled nature of the data over sub-
companies, it should be noted that time invariance is assumed. As such the model is actually an analogue to the time
invariant model first proposed by Pitt and Lee (1981).
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Table 2 Parameter estimates for dual-level Inefficiency models and comparator models
Fixed
Effects1
Random
Effects1
lnTrack 0.84514 *** 0.88682 *** 0.84514 *** 0.88682 *** 0.93453 ***
lnTTKD 0.27821 *** 0.30374 *** 0.27821 *** 0.30374 *** 0.3465 ***
ProElect 0.27771 ** 0.18201 0.27771 ** 0.18201 0.06895
lnWage 0.00809 0.45837 ** 0.00809 0.45837 ** 0.61462 ***
(lnTrack)2 -0.23589 *** -0.19374 *** -0.23589 *** -0.19374 *** -0.15511
*** statistically significant at the 1% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level
Deterministic Frontier
1Note that these parameter estimates are the same as for the dual-level models due to the
two stage estimation approach of the dual-level models used in this example.
Dual Level Inefficiency
Models
Random
Effects
Treatment of ȝ
Fixed Effects
Treatment of
ȝ
Sub-company inefficiency
invariance model
Comparator Models
Pooled
model
Turning to the scale and density findings implied by the frontier parameter estimates, our results
indicate modest returns to scale (RTS13) at the sample mean. RTS is defined as the inverse of the
elasticity of costs resulting from a proportionate increase in track length (region size), holding
traffic density (TTKD) constant. This measure implicitly therefore requires train-km to increase
by the same proportion as region size and is thus analogous to returns to scale. Since our model is
expressed in terms of the logs of track length (lnTrack) and traffic density (lnTTKD), RTS is
computed as 1 / 0.88682 = 1.13 at the sample mean (for the random effects model) and this is
significantly different from unity at the 5% level (both random and fixed effects models).The sign
of the coefficient on the (lnTrack)2 variable indicates that the RTS measure increases with track
length and the variation within the sample is plausible (RTS between 0.7 and 2.5).
We also find much stronger returns to density. Returns to density (RTD) is defined as the inverse
of the proportional change in cost resulting from a proportion change in train km holding network
size constant. Given the way the variables enter our model, RTD corresponds to the inverse of the
cost elasticity with respect to train density (TTKD) and is thus calculated as 1 / 0.30374 = 3.29 at
the sample mean (for the random effects model), which is highly significantly different from
unity in both the random and fixed effects models.
Recent evidence, based on models of rail infrastructure costs, suggests increasing returns to scale,
combined with strong returns to density (see Wheat and Smith 2008; Wheat et. al. 2009;
summarised in Table 3 below). Our findings of modest increasing returns to scale combined with
strong economies of density are therefore in line with previous evidence14. Overall we would
expect RTD to be much stronger than RTS for rail infrastructure, given that only a small
proportion of infrastructure maintenance costs are variable with marginal increments in usage.
13 See Caves et. al. (1981) and Caves et. al. (1984) for use of the terms returns to scale (RTS) and returns to density
(RTD) in empirical applications.
14 In interpreting these results it should be noted that the final two studies in Table 3 utilise firm-level data, whilst the
other studies utilise sub-company data of varying levels of disaggregation.
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Thus there is a substantial proportion of maintenance of cost that is only avoidable through line
closure (see for example Wheat and Nash (2008) and AEA Technology (2005)).
Table 3 Estimates of Returns to Scale and Density from other infrastructure maintenance cost
studies
Study Country Returns to Scale Returns to Density
Our Study International study 1.13 3.29
Munduch et al (2002) Austria 1.449-1.621 3.70
Link (2009) Austria Not reported* 1.82
Wheat and Smith (2008) Britain 2.074 4.18
Johansson and Nilsson (2004) Finland 1.575 5.99
Tervonen and Idstrom (2004) Finland 1.325 5.74-7.51
Gaudry and Quinet (2003) France Not reported* 2.70
Gaudry and Quinet (2009) France Not reported* 2.56
Johansson and Nilsson (2004) Sweden 1.256 5.92
Andersson (2006) Sweden 1.38 4.90
Andersson (2009) Sweden Not reported* 4.00
Marti et. al. (2009) Switzerland Not reported* 4.54
Smith et. al. (2008) International study 1.11 3.25
NERA (2000) US 1.15 2.85
Source: Amended from Wheat and Smith (2008) and Wheat et. al. (2009). RTS and RTD computed based on average
elasticities or elasticities at the sample mean. * Obtaining measures of returns to scale was not the focus of the
analysis and these cannot be derived from the paper given the functional form used.
Of course, there is also a much wider literature based on vertically-integrated railways, covering
infrastructure and operations. Studies from the US suggest constant returns to scale, whilst the
evidence is more mixed in respect of European railways, ranging from decreasing through to
increasing returns to scale. The literature is, however, more conclusive on reporting increasing
returns to density (see, for example, see, for example, Caves et. al., 1985; Gathon and Perelman,
1992; Andrikopolous and Loizides, 1998; and Smith, 2006). Thus our model produces estimates
for RTS and RTD that are in line with both the infrastructure-only rail cost literature and the
broader vertically-integrated railway literature. In this regard we also note that the RTD reported
in our study, and the range of studies in Table 3, are typically greater than those reported for the
vertically integrated railway literature, which is to be expected since stronger returns to density
are anticipated in respect of infrastructure than operations (see Nash, 1985).
The implication of our findings on scale and density are that for this sample there would be cost
savings from making maintenance regions bigger (increasing returns to scale). The policy
prescription may therefore be for regulatory bodies to press for internal re-organisation, though
that decision would need to be assessed against the loss of yardstick information (loss of a
region), and should also consider other evidence15. Further, as is commonly reported in railway
studies, our study indicates that there are substantial unit cost savings from utilising networks
more intensively (increasing returns to density). The policy implications of the latter are probably
15 Note that we find the degree of RTS to increase with track length, which if interpreted literally and simply
extrapolated, would imply a single region within each company. Of course we are more confident in the findings of
our model at the sample mean than at the extremes of the sample (or even out of sample).
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limited to the extent that most network duplication has been eliminated, and the network structure
is largely determined by political considerations.
The a priori sign of ProElect is ambiguous given the extent to which the variable is a proxy for
track quality (that is, higher quality track might be expected to have lower maintenance costs). On
the other hand, electrification means that there are more assets to maintain, makes access to the
infrastructure more complex and may also be associated with higher speed services which
increases cost. Thus the positive coefficient on ProElect (only significant in the fixed effects
model) is neither in line nor at odds with prior expectations. The literal interpretation of the
coefficient in the random effects model, given that ProElect is a proportion variable, is that
electrifying the network (from 0% to 100% track-km electrified) increases maintenance costs by
exp(0.18201)-1=20%.
The coefficient on the wage variable is statistically significant in the random effects model. We
believe that the wage coefficient is insignificant in the fixed effects model since this variable is
invariant for each IM at a given point in time. Thus it is likely there is some correlation between
this and the fixed effects (note however that the Hausman test still prefers random effects).
However, in both models the null hypothesis that the coefficient is different from the average
labour cost share (65%)16 fails to be rejected even at the 10% level. Dropping the wage variable
does not seem to affect the estimates of the deterministic cost frontier.
Overall we find that the parameter estimates are in line with expectations and previous evidence,
thus giving us confidence in the resulting efficiency findings, to which we now turn.
First we consider the statistical significance for each of the inefficiency components within our
model17. The persistent, firm-specific inefficiency effects are modelled as either fixed or random
effects, the latter being estimated by generalised least squares in the two-stage approach that we
adopt here. As such we do not undertake LR tests for whether the variance parameters are zero as
these are not estimated in this estimation framework. Instead we undertake an F test for the joint
significance of the fixed effects and an LM test for the appropriateness of a model without
effects. The F test has a value of 5.34 which yields a p value of 0.00073. As such we find
evidence that the fixed effects are jointly statistically significant.
For the LM test we adopt the Moulton/Randolph standardised form (SLM, Moulton and
Randolph, 1989) which is appropriate for unbalanced panels and is a one sided test (the variance
of the random effect can only be non-negative). Thus we would expect the test to have greater
power than the more standard Breusch and Pagan (1980) test. The value of the SLM statistic is
4.59 and is distributed standard normal under the null of zero random effect variance. Thus we
can reject a model with no effects at any reasonable significance level. Thus all of the tests
provide evidence of significant persistent firm-specific effects. These are then transformed into
persistent efficiency scores via a Schmidt and Sickles (1984) transformation as described in
section 4.
16 Owing to lack of data, this is an estimate based solely on Network Rail data.
17 As noted in section 3 and section 5.1, given the unbalanced nature of the observations over time and the generally
small number of time periods for most IMs, both the firm-specific and sub-company inefficiency components are
time invariant in our model.
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Turning now to the statistical significance of the sub-company varying inefficiency term. In the
two stage approach adopted for this example, we estimate this term by maximum likelihood. As
such we undertake LR tests for the significance of the variance parameter of the inefficiency
distribution. For the dual-level random effects model, the LR statistic is 18.15 and for the dual-
level fixed effects model the LR statistic is 33.23. As described in Coelli et. al. (2005), this
statistic has a non-standard mixed chi square distribution (1 degree of freedom). The large
statistic values mean that in both cases the null hypothesis of zero variance is rejected at any
reasonable significance level. As such we conclude that we have evidence that the data set
exhibits dual-level inefficiency.
Table 4 shows overall firm efficiency scores for each infrastructure manager. It also decomposes
the efficiency scores into the two components; persistent and sub-company varying. As explained
in section 3, these two components can be interpreted as the degree of external and internal
inefficiency respectively. In this example the average persistent efficiency scores for the dual-
level models are 0.849 and 0.835 (random and fixed effects formulations respectively), and 0.851
to 0.690 for the sub-company varying component (random and fixed effects formulations
respectively). Thus the random effects formulation points to roughly equal external and internal
components, while the fixed effects formulation points to more internal than external
inefficiency. As discussed earlier we prefer the random effects results due to the result of the
Hausman test. Overall firm efficiency is the product of the two components, and is higher, on
average, for the random effects dual level model (0.724) than for the fixed effects alternative
(0.564). The overall efficiency scores for the preferred random effects dual level model are within
plausible ranges.
Recall the comparator models are the pooled model and sub-company inefficiency invariance
model. The former assumes that there is no persistent inefficiency within firms, and the
inefficiency of each sub-company is assumed to be identically and independently distributed
across all sub-company units irrespective of the firm to which they belong. The second
comparator model comprises persistent, firm-specific effects only, representing the case where
there is no variation in efficiency performance between sub-company units within the same firm
(the model parameters for these models are simply those for the dual-level models reported in
Table 2). Note that the average overall firm efficiency is considerably lower using the dual-level
model as compared to all three of the comparator models. This is because the comparator models
are constrained models and only consider one source of inefficiency. As discussed above, both
restrictions are rejected for this dataset so we prefer the dual-level models.
In summary, this empirical example has demonstrated the possibility of separating firm
inefficiency into a persistent and a sub-company varying component. It also shows that the failure
to account for the dual-level nature of inefficiency, for example, by estimating one of the three,
simpler comparator models, may cause overall firm inefficiency to be underestimated. We
consider that this latter result holds in general, in the sense that the inefficiency estimated from a
dual-level model will always be at least as large as that estimated from a single level model, at
least asymptotically for the random effects case. Both of these findings are important in the
sphere of economic regulation.
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Table 4 Summary of efficiency results
Firm Fixed Effects
Random
Effects
1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
2 0.770 0.880 0.770 0.880 1.000
3 0.925 0.840 0.925 0.840 1.000
4 0.617 0.687 0.617 0.687 1.000
5 0.862 0.839 0.862 0.839 1.000
Average 0.835 0.849 0.835 0.849 1.000
1 0.621 0.881 1.000 1.000 0.916
2 0.734 0.857 1.000 1.000 0.879
3 0.593 0.819 1.000 1.000 0.779
4 0.853 0.849 1.000 1.000 0.761
5 0.649 0.850 1.000 1.000 0.830
Average 0.690 0.851 1.000 1.000 0.833
1 0.621 0.881 1.000 1.000 0.916
2 0.565 0.754 0.770 0.880 0.879
3 0.549 0.688 0.925 0.840 0.779
4 0.527 0.583 0.617 0.687 0.761
5 0.560 0.713 0.862 0.839 0.830
Average 0.564 0.724 0.835 0.849 0.833
Persistent Efficiency Score - External Efficiency
Sub-company Varying Efficiency Score - Internal Efficiency
Overall Efficiency Score
Dual Level Inefficiency
Models
Comparator Models
Pooled model
Sub-company inefficiency
invariance model
Fixed Effects
Treatment of ȝ
Random
Effects
Treatment of ȝ
6. Conclusions
This paper has outlined a dual-level inefficiency model that supports the analysis not only of firm
inefficiency, but also separates out internal inefficiency from the wider external inefficiency
measure. The distinction between external and internal inefficiency is important in any efficiency
context, but particularly in the regulatory environment. Economic regulators are interested not
only in ensuring that firms match the best practice achieved elsewhere, but also that they
consistently apply that best practice across all parts of the organisation.
The models proposed for dealing with sub-company data are re-interpretations and extensions of
existing panel data inefficiency models. We have demonstrated via an international dataset of rail
infrastructure providers that it is possible to obtain estimates of both components of inefficiency –
internal and external inefficiency – and that the dual-level inefficiency model is preferred over
the simpler single level alternatives. Indeed, our example shows that failing to account for the
dual-level nature of inefficiency may cause overall firm inefficiency to be underestimated; a
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result that we consider applies generally (at least asymptotically), and not just in the example
presented in this paper.
The use of sub-company data also two important, wider benefits. It substantially increases the
number of observations for analysis which addresses a common problem in economic regulation
(small N). It would not have been possible to attempt econometric estimation based on just five
firms, given the short panel. It is also beneficial for both efficiency performance analysis and
more generally cost analysis to analyse data at a level of geographical aggregation that
corresponds to how firms organise their activities. This allows both for any dual-level
inefficiency to be captured, but also allows for the true scale and density properties of the cost
frontier to be established. In this respect we note that the frontier parameter estimates of our
model indicate small economies of scale and much stronger economies of density, in line with
previous studies utilising disaggregate data. The finding of plausible frontier parameter estimates
also gives us confidence in the resulting efficiency findings. The implication of our findings on
scale and density are that for this sample there would be cost savings from making maintenance
regions bigger (increasing returns to scale). The policy prescription may therefore be for
regulatory bodies to press for internal re-organisation, though that decision would need to be
assessed against the loss of yardstick information (loss of a region), and should also consider
other evidence.
We therefore consider that the approach demonstrated in this paper has wide application in a
range of regulatory and other contexts. Most large, regulated companies have some kind of sub-
company structure, often based on geographical disaggregation, with some degree of
management autonomy at the sub-company level. To our knowledge, the benefits and modelling
issues associated with expanding datasets to include sub-company data – including the
similarities to and differences from the standard panel case – have not been discussed in the
literature.
We note two issues however. Firstly, whilst sub-company data offers some interesting efficiency
analysis possibilities, one concern might be that disaggregation increases the degree of noise in
the data. Secondly, an additional challenge might be that regulated firms can influence what costs
are recorded in each sub-company, although it may be possible for economic regulators to set
strict reporting requirements and standards to address this problem. Further empirical analysis of
sub-company datasets in a regulatory context, using the models set out in this paper, would
therefore be valuable in shedding light on these issues.
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